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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY
DOCTRINE-A THREAT TO TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court decision of McCulloch v. Maryland' first established
the principle that instrumentalities of the federal government were constitutionally immune from state taxation. Subsequent to that decision, the so-called
federal instrumentality doctrine rose and declined in popularity both within the
general body of American law and within that body of law particularly dealing
with Indian tribes.'
In its prime, the federal instrumentality doctrine immunized from state
taxation Indian land,' lessees of Indian property4 and the leases5 themselves.
These were deemed to be instrumentalities through which the federal government
fulfilled its obligations to the Indians. By creating a barrier against state encroachment through taxation, the federal instrumentality doctrine was of financial
benefit to the tribe, and, as such, was protective of tribal existence and selfsufficiency.
In recent years, however, the Ninth Circuit has employed the federal instrumentality doctrine in an entirely different context and for a purpose destructive of Indian cultural survival. In lieu of considering Indian lands, lessees
of Indian property or the leases themselves as federal instrumentalities, the "new"
federal instrumentality doctrine bestows such status upon institutions constituting
the tribal government. Thus labeled, those institutions do not enjoy additional
benefits. Rather, they have been subjected, in three recent Ninth Circuit
decisions,6 to restraints incumbent upon federal agencies.
Not only does the federal instrumentality doctrine as applied by the Ninth
Circuit effectively negate independent tribal authority to self-govern,r it also
contradicts the proposition endorsed by the Supreme Court that tribal action
is not restricted by the United States Constitution.' The Supreme Court decision
establishing that rule of law is still purportedly followed by the Ninth Circuit
itself.9
The importance of the "new" federal instrumentality doctrine is not mooted
by application of parts of the Constitution to Indian tribes through the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 10 That legislation, passed in 1968, did not subject
1

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
For an account of this development see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Texas Co., 336 U.S.
342 (1948'); Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the United States, 6 Nat'l. Tax
2

J. 305 (1953).

3 United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
4 See, e.g., Choctaw & Gulf RR. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
5 Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916) (as explained in
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1948)).
6 United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977) (No. 76-1629); Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1965).
7 See Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F.Supp. 17, 23 (D. Ariz. 1968).
8 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
9 Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976).
10 25 U.S.C. § 1301-03 '(Supp. 1977). Section 1302 of that statute provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-goverment shall358
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tribal action to all of the constitutional restraints upon the federal and state
governments. By erasing the distinction between tribal and federal action, the
federal instrumentality doctrine may subject the tribes to those constitutional and
statutory restraints upon the federal government not extended to the tribes by
legislation such as the Indian Civil Rights Act. With regard to those restraints
extended by congressional act but given a narrow interpretation consistent with
tribal sovereignty, federal instrumentality status also remains a crucial issue.
Tribal freedom from these restrictions is in jeopardy due to the federal instrumentality doctrine articulated by the Ninth Circuit.
The objective of this note is to examine the Ninth Circuit's federal instrumentality doctrine against the background of 1) the traditional federal instrumentality doctrine and 2) the cases dealing with constitutional accountability of
Indian tribes. The note will discuss the utility of the Ninth Circuit's doctrine and
the propriety of judicially imposing upon tribal government those restraints which
limit federal action.
II. The Old Federal Instrumentality Doctrine
The federal instrumentality doctrine is new neither to Indian law nor to
United States jurisprudence in general. McCulloch v. Maryland" first established
the proposition that an instrumentality of the federal government is not subject to
'taxation by the states. Following that landmark decision came a rash of claims by
private parties alleging that they fell within the category of "federal instrumentality" because their activities furthered governmental objectives. The number of persons successfully using the federal instrumentality doctrine to obtain
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a
fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws
or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
'(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
Section 1303 provides:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian

11

tribe.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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federal immunity increased until, ultimately, the Supreme Court began to reject
peripheral claims to such immunity.12
A similar pattern occurred in Indian law." United States v. Rickert"
established the rule that allotted trust landsI' in Indian possession were federal
instrumentalities and not subject to state taxation. In prohibiting state taxation
the Court stated:
If, as is undoubtedly the case, these lands are held by the United States in
execution of its plans relating to the Indians. .

. ,

it would follow that there

was no power in the State of South Dakota, for state or municipal purposes,
to assess and tax the lands in question until at least the fee was conveyed
to the Indians .... To tax these lands is to tax an instrumentalityemployed
by the United States for the benefit and control of this16 dependent race, and
to accomplish beneficent objects with reference [to it].

The Rickert Court also regarded permanent improvements upon the land and
personal property issued by the federal government as instrumentalities in furtherance of federal goals for the tribe. As such they, too, were immune from state
taxation.
In Choctaw and Gulf RR v. Harrisionythe Supreme Court extended the
federal instrumentality doctrine by holding a lessee of the Choctaw and
Chickasaw tribes immune from that portion of a state tax upon gross sales of
coal which fell upon sales of coal from Indian-owned mines. Lessee railroad was
considered an instrumentality of the federal government through which the
United States' obligations under an agreement with the tribes were carried into
effect.
The Choctaw decision spawned numerous decisions granting federal instrumentality status to other lessees subject to various types of state taxes.' Successful
12 For an account of this development, see Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities
in the United States, 6 Nat'l. Tax J. 305 (1953).
13 For an account of this development, see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336
U.S. 342 (1950). It should be noted that application of the label "federal instrumentality" to
Indian lands, lessees of Indian property, or the leases themselves was an unnecessary, albeit
beneficial, tool of the federal courts to establish tribal immunity from state taxation. In The
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866), such immunity was extended to the tribes
because they were sovereign in their own right. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisicns
have based immunity from state taxation upon the combined theories of tribal sovereignty and
federal preemption. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973).
14 188 U.S. 432 (1903).

15

These terms are defined in F.

COHEN,

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN

LAW

(1942):

"The process of allotment shifted the rights of individual Indians in real property from the
rights of participation in tribal property . . . to rights of ownership in individual tracts." Id.
at 206.
"Under the General Allotment Act and related legislation, the allottee receives what is called
a "trust patent" the theory being, that the United States retains legal title to the land. Alienation of the land, therefore, requires either the consent of the United States to the alienation
or, as a prerequisite to a valid conveyance, the issuance of a fee patent to the allottee." Id. at
109.
16 188 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).
17 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
18 Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916), followed
Choctaw and held the assignee of an Indian oil and gas lease immune from state taxation of
the lease's value. The lessee, and possibly the lease itself, according to Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1948), was apparently a federal instrumentality. Two per curiam
decisions, Howard v. Gypsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1917) and Large Oil Co. v. Howard,
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use of the federal instrumentality doctrine, however, began to wane in the
1930's.19 The ultimate coup de grace was Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas,2"
which overruled Choctaw and similar cases granting lessees of Indian land immunity from state taxation.
The "old" federal instrumentality doctrine merits attention in this note,
not because of its ultimate fate in the courts, but because of the contrast between
it and the newer version created by the Ninth Circuit.
First, under the "old" doctrine, entities other than the tribe itself or the
tribal government were considered federal instrumentalities. In Rickert, tribal
property was so considered because of its importance to the United States in
discharging its duty to the Sisseton Band of Sioux Indians. Similarly, in the
Choctaw line of cases, the lessee of tribal lands, or the lease itself, not the tribal
government or its institutions, was a federal instrumentality through which the
federal government attempted to achieve its goals.
Secondly, the old federal instrumentality doctrine was a benevolent tool of
the courts, used to reinforce tribal sovereignty. By immunizing tribal property,
or tribal lessees from state taxation, the court conferred a financial benefit upon
the tribe.
III. The New Federal Instrumentality Doctrine
In contrast to the old federal instrumentality doctrine, a device protective
of tribal existence, the new federal instrumentality doctrine destroys tribal
sovereignty. Unlike its predecessor, the new doctrine considers an institution of
248 U.S. 549 (1918), relied upon Choctaw and Indian Territory Illuminating Oil, and held
similar lessees immune from state taxation of gross production. Justice Holmes, over three
dissents, extended the immunity even further in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1921),
by immunizing a lessee from state tax upon the net income it derived from sales of oil and gas
from Indian-owned land. Then, in Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 (1926), a
lessee-federal instrumentality was immunized from an ad valorem tax levied upon ore mined
from restricted Indian lands.
19 In Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, 288 U.S. 325 '(1933), a lessee who had already
paid for and removed oil from restricted Indian property was held subject to the state's ad
valorem tax. The oil being taxed, unlike that in jaybird, supra note 18, was deemed to be
"awaiting disposition at petitioner's pleasure" and "was for its sole advantage." Id. at 328.
The Court rejected the claim of tax immunity and distinguished Choctaw and the other federal
instrumentality cases on the theory that any immunity the lessees enjoyed as a federal instrumentality extended no further than necessary for the protection of its operations as a governmental tool.
State power to levy a non-discriminatory ad valorem tax upon equipment used by a lessee
in production of oil and gas from restricted Indian lands was upheld in Taber v. Indian Territory Co., 300 U.S. 1 (1936).
In 1937, Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1937) overruled Gillespie, supra
note 18, and required a "direct and substantial interference" with the performance of the
government's obligations in order to sustain tax immunity. Id. at 384.
20 336 U.S. 342 (1948). In addition to Choctaw and several other cases, Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n overruled Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., Howard, and Large Oil, supra note
18, and held that non-discriminatory gross production taxes and state excise taxes were not
invalid as applied to petroleum produced under lease of allotted and restricted Indian lands.
Immunity from estate and inheritance taxes followed a similar development. See, e.g.,
West v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 334 U.S. 717 (1948); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United
States, 319 U.S. 598 (1942); Childers v. Beaver, 270 U.S. 555 (1925).
See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding tribe subject to
state tax upon gross receipts of off-reservation Indian ski resort and immune from use tax);
Leahy v. State, 297 U.S. 420 (1936) (state income tax); Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691
(1931) (federal income tax).
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tribal government itself as an agency of the federal government. Far from being
benevolent, it subjects tribal institutions to restraints incumbent upon the federal
government.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is thus potentially devastating to tribal sovereignty." Moreover, it directly contradicts a long line of authority deriving from
the Supreme Court and cited with approval to this day by the Ninth Circuit
itself.22 Some of these cases expressly state that institutions of tribal government
are not federal instrumentalities.23 Others implicitly express that view by refusing
to apply the federal constitution to tribal action. 4
A. Talton v. Mayes
The Supreme Court decision of Talton v. Mayes 5 established the oft-repeated rule that action of an Indian tribal government is not restricted by the
United States Constitution. Specifically at issue in Talton was the fifth amendment.
Talton, a Cherokee Indian, was convicted by the Cherokee court of the
murder of a fellow Indian within reservation boundaries. The case came to
federal court on a petition for habeas corpus which alleged, inter alia, that the
Indian grand jury, which in accordance with Cherokee law consisted of only five
persons, was not a grand jury within the contemplation of the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Further, petitioner asserted that due to the
composition of the grand jury he was denied fourteenth amendment due process.
The issue before the Supreme Court turned upon the source of tribal governmental authority. The petitioner argued that since Congress had authority to
regulate tribal affairs, tribal authority derived from, and was limited by, the
United States Constitution.
The Court's response to that contention was that:
the existence of the right in -Congress to regulate the manner in which the
local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised does not render such
local powers. Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of
the United States ....

[A]s the powers of local self-government enjoyed by

the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated
upon by the Fifth Amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole object
to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National GovernmentY6
21

See Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 23 (D. Ariz. 1958).

22
23

Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., United States v. Elk, No. 77-1263 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 1977); United States v.

Walking Crow, No. 77-1136 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1977); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674
(10th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of the Southern Ute Reservation,

249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958); Sturdevant v. Deer 70
F.R.D. 539 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
24 See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church of North
America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959); Barta v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932
(1959).
25 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
26 Id. at 384.
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Far from equating Indian government with an agency of the federal government,
the Supreme Court, in its only encounter with the question of tribal accountability
under the United States Constitution, strongly endorsed tribal sovereignty and
independence from restrictions upon federal action."
The Talton doctrine has frequently been applied in the federal courts to
resolve similar questions concerning application of the constitution to tribal
action. Most notable are the following cases.
B. The Talton Progeny
In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of the Southern Ute Reservation," the
daughter of a full-blooded Ute male and a non-Indian female petitioned the
Colorado District Court for relief, alleging that she was wrongfully denied membership and its benefits by the Southern Ute Tribe. The court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. According to the court, Martinez
put forth no claim arising under or requiring interpretation or construction of
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. The opinion concentrated
upon the contention that the claim arose under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. In the course of its decision, however, the court also discussed the theory
that a claim such as that of Martinez arose under the fifth amendment:
It is equally clear that the Due Process clause of the fifth amendment does
not apply to the activities of the tribe or corporation for, although the
Interior Department has ruled that for certain purposes Indian tribes are to
be regarded as agencies of the federal government. . . , the doctrine that
an Indian tribe is not a federal instrumentality within the various statutory

and constitutional restrictions upon federal instrumentalities has not been
changed since it was laid down in Talton v. Mayes, supra.2 9

The Talton holding concentrated on negating application of the fifth amendment to the constitution. Martinez too, spoke only in terms of that amendment.
The Eighth Circuit, however, in Barta v. OglalaSioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation3" directly addressed the question of whether the fourteenth or fifth amendment applied to tribal action. In that case the Oglala Sioux had levied a use tax
upon non-Indian lessees of tribal trust lands. When the defendants refused to
pay the tax, both the tribe and the United States on behalf of the tribe sued for
amounts due. To the defendants' allegations of constitutional violations the
court replied:

27 Petitioner's fourteenth amendment claim was denied based upon Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884) and McNulty v. California, 149 U.S. 645 (1893). These cases held that

where a state constitution authorized prosecution by information, the fourteenth amendment

due process clause did not necessarily require a state indictment by grand jury.
28 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958).
29 Id. at 919. The Interior Department's rulings are Op. Sol. I.D., M 29156, Jun. 30, 1937
and Op. Sol. I.D., M27810, Dec. 13, 1934. In these two opinions of the solicitor, the tribe
itself was spoken of as a federal instrumentality in order to exempt it from Social Security tax
and state tax respectively.
30 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
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The Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on legislative actions by the
states ....The Indian tribes are not, however, states and these constitutional
limitations have no application to the actions, legislative in character, by
Indian tribes. Neither may the Fifth Amendment be invoked as against any
legislative action of the Indian tribes."
In Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 2
the Tenth Circuit once again passed upon the question of tribal accountability
under the United States Constitution, this time with regard to the first, fourth,
and fifth amendments. The Navajo Tribal Council had criminalized the sale, use
and possession of peyote, a drug central to the religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church of North America. The Church sought injunctive relief from
the New Mexico district court against the enforcement of the tribal ordinance,
basing its claim upon the United States Constitution. After reviewing with
approval opinions espousing the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 3 and precedent
denying application of the Constitution of tribal action, 4 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition. The court held that the Constitution, "as any other law, is binding upon Indian nations only where it expressly binds them, or is made binding by treaty or some act of Congress." 35
Since the amendments in question did not fulfill these conditions, they did not
restrict tribal action.
C. The Ninth Circuit'sFederalInstrumentality Doctrine
Against this formidable background of precedent the new federal instrumentality decisions3 6 stand out as aberrations. The theory of those cases is that
certain institutions of tribal government derive authority from and are agencies
of the federal government.
Two of the new federal instrumentality doctrine cases concern habeas
corpus proceedings dealing with arrests occurring prior to the passage of the
ICRA. Jurisdiction to hear these claims was predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (c).
A detailed analysis of this statute is necessary in order to fully ap31 Id. at 556-57. The court cited Talton and quoted extensively from F. COHEN, supra
note 15.
32 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
33 United States v.Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 '(1886); Worcester v.Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832). The court also quoted extensively from F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 123,
and cited in a footnote "a long line of cases" adhering to Kagama and Worcester. 272 F.2d at
133 n.2.
34 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Toledo v.
Pueble de Jernez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D. N.M. 1954) (cited for the proposition that constitutional deprivation by tribal government could not be redressed by action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983). The Tenth Circuit discussed F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 124, as follows:
Cohen's Handbook . . . states that restraints upon Congress or upon the Federal
courts or upon the States, by the Constitution, do not apply to Indian tribal laws and
courts. And ...it is stated that, "The provisions of the Federal Constitution protecting personal liberty or property rights, do not apply to tribal action."
272 F.2d at 134.
35 272 F.2d at 135.
36 See note 6 supra for a citation of these cases.
37 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) provides:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
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preciate9 the cases of Colliflower v. Garland 8 and Settler v. Yakima Tribal
3

Court.

Section 2241 (c) lists five bases of federal jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
petitions. Sections 2241(c) (2), (4) and (5) had no possible application to the
cases before the Ninth Circuit. Section 2241 (c) (1) grants jurisdiction to review
custody "under or by color of the authority of the United States or... for trial
before some court thereof"; § 2241 (c) (3) grants jurisdiction to review "custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
The rationale of Talton and its progeny would appear to preclude an argument under § 2241 (c) (1) that Indian tribunals were courts of the federal government. These cases either expressly ruled to the contrary 40 or held Indian
tribunals immune from constitutional restrictions.4 Similarly, equating tribal
custody with custody "under or by color of the authority of the United States"
under § 2241(c) (1) could not be squared with the Talton analysis. Talton
itself held that tribal authority derived not from federal sources, but from preUnited States Indian sovereignty. More specifically, creation and administration
of a judicial system has been held to be an exercise of this inherent tribal
authority.
The Talton line of cases would also appear to dispose of the contention
under § 2241 (c) (3) that custody by an Indian tribe could be in violation of the
constitution. According to those decisions the constitution does not protect individuals from the actions of an Indian tribe.4
Application of the Talton doctrine would dictate that, if habeas corpus
jurisdiction over tribal custody exists at all, it must be under that part 'of §
2241(c) (3) dealing with custody in violation of federal law or treaties. An
Indian tribe could arguably4 4 incarcerate someone in violation of a federal law
specifically limiting tribal sovereignty or in violation of the tribe's treaties with
the United States. The only inquiry in these pre-ICRA tribal custody cases
therefore, should have been whether the custody was in resolution of an internal
affair as defined by treaty and federal law. If so, federal courts would have no
jurisdictional basis for review.
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of
Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority,
privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or
sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of
which depend upon the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
38 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
39 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
40 See note 23, supra.
41 See note 24, supra.
42 Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
43 The thirteenth amendment, which has been held to apply generally within the United
States, may be an exception to this rule. See In Re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327 (D. Alas. 1886).
44 Some may argue that even in this situation the federal court has no jurisdiction since
custody by an Indian tribe in violation of treaty or laws is analogous to such custody by a private
person or by a foreign nation. Neither of these were affected by passage of § 2241 (c) (3), which
only spoke to federal or state custody.
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The Ninth Circuit in Colliflower v. Garland45 and Settler v. Yakima Tribal
Court" disagreed with this analysis.
1. Colliflower v. Garland
Colliflower v. Garland was the first of the Ninth Circuit cases to equate
Indian court action with federal action. In 1965, Madeline Coffiflower, a member of the Gros Ventre Indian tribe of Fort Belknap Indian Community, sought
a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the District of
Montana. Colliflower had been incarcerated after being found guilty by the Fort
Belknap Court of Indian Offenses of disobeying an Indian court order to remove
her cattle from reservation land leased by another. Her petition to federal court
alleged violations of her federal constitutional rights to counsel, trial, confrontation of the witnesses against her, and due process. When the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Colliflower appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Under the above analysis of § 2241, the Ninth Circuit would have had
difficulty granting habeas corpus jurisdiction. The offense of which Colliflower
had been convicted by the Indian court was plainly within the jurisdiction of the
Fort Belknap Court under applicable treaties and laws of the United States.
Therefore, assuming that the above analysis of § 2241 is correct, the court should
have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the federal
court, under §§ 2241(c)(1) and 2241 (c) (3), had jurisdiction to hear Colliflower's petition for habeas corpus. After reviewing the history of the Fort
Belknap Court of Indian Offenses, most notably its organization by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 7 its use of the federally created laws for Courts of
Indian Offenses, 8 and its federal funding, the Ninth Circuit held that:
In spite of the theory that for some purposes an Indian tribe is an independent sovereignty, we think that, in the light of their history, it is pure
fiction to say that the Indian courts functioning in the Fort Belknap Indian
community are not in part, at least, ar-ns of the federal government. 49
Tribal action under the label "federal instrumentality" thus fulfilled both §§
2241(c) (1) and (3). Custody by this arn of the federal government was "by
color of" United States authority, and could be in violation of the United States
Constitution.5
The Ninth Circuit did not ignore precedent under the Talton doctrine. It
attempted, unpersuasively, to distinguish it. Neither Native American Church
45 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
46 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
47 The court at Fort Belknap reservation may not have been a "true" Court of Indian
Offenses. See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
48 25 C.F.R. 11 (1976).
49 Id. at 378-79.
50 Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)'(3) also speaks of custody in violation of federal law
and treaties, the Colliflower court admitted that the Fort Belknap court had jurisdiction over
the offense, and concentrated upon whether the constitution applied to Indian court procedure.
Its reliance, therefore, was upon that part of § 2241(c) (3) dealing with custory in violation
of the Constitution.
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nor Barta,according to the court, decided the issue of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Although that statement is correct, the Tenth and Eighth Circuits in those cases
held that the tribe was not restricted by the Bill of Rights, and thereby implicitly
denied federal instrumentality status. Under the rationale of these decisions,
jurisdiction under § 2241 (c) (1) (custody by color of United States authority),
and § 2241 (c) (3) (custody in violation of the Constitution), should have been
denied.
Talton, on the other hand, did deal with a petition for habeas corpus. In
an attempt to circumvent the reasoning of that case, the Ninth Circuit in Colliflower argued that the Supreme Court's decision on the merits rather than on
jurisdictional grounds confirmed that claims such as that of Coriflower are
cognizable under § 2241, even though ultimately the Constitution was held not
applicable. The Ninth Circuit apparently reasoned that the Supreme Court must
have considered the tribe either a federal instrumentality or otherwise subject to
the constitution for the purpose of fulfilling the habeas corpus jurisdictional
statute, even though the Talton Court in its decision on the merits did not consider the tribe subject to the Constitution. In thus using Talton to justify separation of the threshold issue of habeas corpus jurisdiction and the ultimate issue of
constitutional accountability, the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge a fact
which was brought out elsewhere in the Colliflower opinion: the Cherokee treaty
relevant in Talton specifically required that tribal law be consistent with the
United States Constitution."' Unfortunately, the Talton court did not explain
why it had jurisdiction. With the aid of this express treaty provision, however,
it is arguable that habeas corpus jurisdiction would extend in behalf of one alleging detention by the tribe "in violation of the Constitution ... or treaties of the
United States." No similar provision was present in Colliflower.
Even assuming the validity of dissecting the "federal instrumentality"
analysis, one might question the utility of such a move. A court relying upon
Colliflower to establish jurisdiction will at the trial on the merits find itself
constrained by precedent to reject the claim of constitutional violation until such
time as Talton is overruled.
2. The Settler Litigation
52
a. Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court

One such futile exercise was the Settler litigation. In 1969, the Ninth
51 Even so, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to extend the fifth amendment to
the Cherokee Nation. The Court stated, however, "that their powers of local self-government
are also operated upon and restrained by the general provisions of the Constitution." 163 U.S.
at 384. The Talton Court did not provide an explanation of that statement. The Colliflower
court stated with regard to the Talton language: "Whether the court was of this opinion
because of the language of the treaty, or otherwise, does not appear." 342 F.2d at 378. F.
COHEN, supra note 15, at 124, states that Talton does not mean that Indian tribes are not
subject to the Constitution and uses the thirteenth amendment, which prohibits slavery absolutely, as an example of a constitutional prohibition which has been held applicable to the
tribes. See note 43 supra. COHEN continues that, "Where, however, the United States Constitution levies particular restraints upon federal courts or upon Congress, these restraints do
not apply to the courts or legislatures of the Indian tribes. Likewise, particular restraints upon
the states are inapplicable to Indian tribes" (footnotes omitted). See note 74 infra.
52 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
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Circuit held that, under Colliflower, the federal court had jurisdiction to hear
Settler's habeas corpus claim. The tribal court was deemed a federal instrumentality for the purposes of fulfilling § 2241. In its 1974 decision on the merits,
the Ninth Circuit did an analytical about-face and denied Settler's claim. The
court concluded that before passage of the ICRA the tribal court was not
restrained by the fifth and sixth amendments. It could not, therefore, have been
considered a federal instrumentality. Although the Settler litigation ultimately
reinforced the Talton doctrine, in the course of its disposition the court utilized
and extended the new federal instrumentality doctrine as a device to acquire
habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Alvin Settler had been arrested before the effective date of the ICRA,"'
and convicted of violating off-reservation tribal fishing regulations and of disobeying the orders of the tribal court. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleged violations by the tribal court of fifth and sixth amendment rights to
counsel and to freedom from double jeopardy. 4
The district court decided that the issues before the tribal court were
within the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction. It distinguished Colliflower on several
grounds55 and dismissed Settler's petition for habeas corpus.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit conceded that "as a general rule the regulation of Indian fishing was an internal affair of the Yakima Nation under the
authority of the Treaty of 1859."" Such being the case, the court could have
followed the district court's lead by concluding that tribal resolution of an affair
within the tribe's jurisdiction was not subject to attack through a federal habeas
corpus petition alleging constitutional violation. The Ninth Circuit, however,
chose to grant habeas corpus jurisdiction relying on its version of the federal instrumentality doctrine and the following reasoning:
We concede that as a general rule the regulation of fishing is an internal
affair of the Yakima Nation under the authority of the Treaty of 1859. The
Indian Nation has exclusive authority to regulate the time, place and manner
of Indian fishing on the reservation (just as the several states have exclusive
authority to exercise the police power) in the absence of the exercise of
paramount authority by the United States. The very definition, however,
53 If his claim had arisen after the effective date of the ICRA, jurisdiction would have
been under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1977) for violations of 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. 1977).
See note 10 supra, for the text of these provisions.
54 Mr. Settler alleged multiple prosecutions by the tribal court. This claim should be
distinguished from that in Walking Grow, Elk and Wheeler, infra, in which defendants challenged the propriety of federal prosecution after trial by tribal authorities.
55 The court noted several differences between the Colliflower case and that of Mr. Settler.
The Fort Belknap court was supported by federal funds while the Yakima Tribal Court was
not. The exclusive right of taking fish was reserved to the Yakima nation by treaty; Mr.
Settler's right to fish derived from his membership in the tribe. Moreover, the treaty referred to
the Yakima tribe as a sovereign nation. The court stated its holding as follows:
The Court can only conclude from the language of the treaty, the peculiar status of
the Yakima Tribal Court, the fact that the specific right is delineated in the body of
the treaty, and the use of the word nation when referring to the authorization of the
signators, that it was intended to confer to the sovereign Yakima nation exclusive
jurisdiction of the fishing rights set forth in the body of the treaty, and that this last
vestige of sovereignty should be preserved.
This Court, therefore, concludes that it has no jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, No. 68-2378 at 7 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 1968).
56 419 F.2d at 488.
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indicates that the Indians' exclusive authority is not boundless. The attempt
by a state to prosecute its citizens in a summary and arbitrary fashion may
be successfully attacked, as may an attempt to regulate certain activities of
its domiciliaries without the state. Likewise (without expressing any opinion
on the merits of the constitutional issues in the present case), although the
Fourteenth Amendment may not apply to tribal courts, there must be and
is a limit to the "exclusive" authority of the Yakima Nation to regulate
Indian fishing when that regulation becomes so summary and arbitrary as to
shock the conscience of the federal court, or goes beyond the scope of
authority originally contemplated by the Treaty of

1859.

7

There are two ways to view this ambiguous passage. First, the court may
have fashioned two additional non-federal instrumentality doctrine grounds upon
which to interfere with tribal action. Federal courts could, under this view,
restrain tribal activity when that action shocks the conscience of the court or
when that action exceeds the scope of authority contemplated by treaty. Second,
the court may have told us when the tribe would be considered a federal instrumentality. According to this interpretation, a tribal body will be considered a
federal instrumentality when its action shocks the court or exceeds the scope of
its authority.
If the first interpretation is accurate, the Ninth Circuit may have created
two new grounds upon which subsequent courts could, without using the federal
instrumentality doctrine, justify federal habeas corpus intervention in tribal
action. Four years earlier the Colliflower court had decided that for purposes of
habeas corpus jurisdiction, action of the Fort Belknap Court of Indian Offenses
was to be considered federal action. Under the first interpretation, however, the
Settler v. Yakima court constructed two new limitations upon tribal action qua
tribal action, as distinguished from federal action through the tribe. According to
the first limitation, even assuming that resolution of disputes involving off-reservation fishing rights was an internal affair, tribal courts could not act arbitrarily.
As with states, there must be some limit upon arbitrary action. What limit? The
court's only response was: perhaps not the fourteenth amendment, but some
limit that puts a halt to tribal action which shocks the conscience of the court.
A simple answer to this contention is that nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 entitles a
tribal prisoner whose confinement shocks the conscience of the federal court to
a writ of habeas corpus.
The second non-federal instrumentality limitation proposed by the Ninth
Circuit is equally fallacious. The court opined that there must be a limitation
on the exclusive authority of the tribe to regulate Indian fishing "when that regulation ... goes beyond the scope of authority originally contemplated by the
Treaty of 1859.""s The tribe could, apparently, handle an internal matter in
such a way as to exceed the scope of its authority by violating certain rights which
individuals have against the federal government. 9 This new peg upon which
57 Id. at 488-89.
58 Id. at 489.
59 This argument should be distinguished from the argument that the court has habeas
corpus jurisdiction if the tribe oversteps its jurisdiction as defined by treaty and federal law.
See text accompanying note 44 supra. The Ninth Circuit is arguing here that even though by
reference to all the relevant treaties and federal law the issue is "internal," the tribe could be
exceeding some undefined boundary by handling an internal affair in an unsatisfactory manner.
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to hang constitutional application to tribal action would, however, entail reading
into the treaty language a requirement that in exercising control over internal
affairs the tribe act within the confines of the federal constitution. Such a requirement is not to be found in the Yakima treaties, and its creation by the
Ninth Circuit could not be squared with present canons of treaty interpretation."0
The second and less revolutionary interpretation of the Settler v. Yakima
language postulates that it was used merely to bolster the court's reliance on the
federal instrumentality doctrine. In other words, when the court said that "there
must be and is a limit" it was referring to the federal instrumentality doctrine as
that limit. Under this interpretation the Ninth Circuit's message was that the
tribal court would be considered a federal instrumentality when there was need
for a limit upon its action, i.e., when its action shocked the conscience of the
court or exceeded the scope of its authority contemplated by treaty.
In Settler v. Yakima the Ninth Circuit relied on the federal instrumentality
doctrine as applied in Colliflower. It also extended that doctrine. Colliflower
dealt solely with the status of the Fort Belknap Court of Indian Offenses. The
Ninth Circuit specifically limited its holding by stating that "We confine our
decision to the courts of the Fort Belknap reservation. The history of other
Indian courts may call for a different ruling, a question not before us."'"
In order to fully appreciate the implications of Settler v. Yakima, a brief
discussion of Indian courts is in order.6" Indian courts fall into three general
categories: traditional courts, Courts of Indian Offenses and tribal courts. Traditional courts are semi-religious courts not conforming to any Anglo-American
model, and found only on several Pueblo reservations in New Mexico. The
action of these courts has not been challenged as federal action before the Ninth
Circuit.
In 1883, due to the breakdown of traditional Indian systems of justice upon
some reservations, the Department of the Interior created Courts of Indian Offenses. 3 Judges of such courts are appointed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
60 The canons of treaty interpretation are well established and were fully reiterated by the
Ninth Circuit in Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 236-37 (9th Cir. 1974). According to
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1904), a treaty constitutes a grant of rights from the
tribe to the United States government; any rights not granted are retained by the tribe. Even
if the tribe has granted rights to the federal government, the court must in interpreting the treaty
consider "[h]ow the words of the treaty were understood by the unlettered people, rather than
their critical meaning." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832). "Doubtful
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of
the nation .. " Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). Throughout the years these
canons have been repeatedly quoted with approval. The Supreme Court, in the recent decision
of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), quoted the Worcester and
Carpenter rules with approval and used them in conjunction "with the tradition of Indian
independence" to interpret the treaty there in question.
61 342 F.2d at 379.
62 The following discussion of Indian courts was taken from Kerr, Constitutional Rights,
Tribal justice, and the American Indian, 18 J. PuB. L. 311, 320-23 (1969) and 18 ST. Louis
L. J. 461 (1974). See also Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
63 By setting up Courts of Indian Offenses, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs did not
create tribal authority to administer a system of justice. That authority 'vas an integral part of
pre-United States tribal sovereignty. Cf. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th
Cir. 1975); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). It may justifiably be argued that executive action of the United States government merely organized the
tribes' judicial power at a time when, due to non-Indian intrusion upon tribal life, the traditional tribal systems of justice had broken down. Courts of Indian Offenses, under this view,
derive their authority, if not their structure, from the tribes themselves. But see Indian Tribal
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upon approval by the tribal council, and are paid with federal funds. Federal
law, as well as consistent tribal law and customs, is enforced by the Courts of
Indian Offenses.
Today, the majority of Indian courts are tribal courts. These are established
by the tribes themselves in exercise of their inherent tribal sovereignty. They
operate independently of the Department of the Interior and enforce tribal codes.
The Eighth Circuit in Iron Crow v. OglalaSioux Tribe 4 held "that tribal courts
are not creations of the federal constitution or of federal statutes, and that their
jurisdiction is inherent with respect to all matters that have not been taken
away from them."65
The Fort Belknap court at issue in Colliflower was probably not a "true"
Court of Indian Offenses within the meaning of 25 C.F.R. 11. Oliver v. Udall"G
held that adoption by the Navajo Tribal Council of the Department of Interior's
law and order code transformed that law into tribal law. Adoption and use of
tribal law appears to be the crucial distinction between a Court of Indian Offenses
and a tribal court. At the time of the Colliflower controversy the Fort Belknap
community had adopted its own law and order code, yet the Fort Belknap court
retained an important incident of a Court of Indian Offenses: its judges were
paid by the federal government.
It is unclear whether the Fort Belknap court was considered by the Ninth
Circuit as a Court of Indian Offenses. The Colliflower court used the title
"Fort Belknap Court of Indian Offenses" and dwelt upon the history and characteristics of such courts in the course of its decision. If Colliflower revolved
around the status of a true Court of Indian Offenses, Settler v. Yakima significantly extended the scope of the federal instrumentality doctrine by applying it
to a tribal court, i.e., a court established and administered by the tribe itself in
exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty.
Even if the Colliflower court considered the court at Fort Belknap a tribal
court, resolution of the plight of Alvin Settler was another step toward general
federal instrumentality status of all Indian courts. Settler's complaint was against
a court whose judges were paid by the tribe rather than by the federal government. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument advanced by the Yakima Tribal
Court that it was substantially different from the Fort Belknap Court of Indian
Offenses. The court of appeals noted that, although not directly funded by the
federal government, the Yakima court was not-financially independent." Even
if it were financially independent, federal funding of the Fort Belknap court was
"merely one factor considered in finding that such courts were at least in part a
federal agency.""8 In failing to distinguish between the more independent
Courts and Procedural Due Process: A Different Standard?, 99 IND. L. J. 721, 728 (1974).
64 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
65 This paraphrase of the Iron Crow holding is found in United States v. Walking Crow,
No. 77-1136 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1977). See note 63 supra, where it is argued that the Courts
of Indian Offenses derive their authority from the tribe. A fortiori, Indian tribal courts,
organized by the tribes themselves in exercise of their inherent power, need no authority from
the United States to justify their existence.
66 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963).
67 The trial court noted that the Yakina Tribal Court is not federally funded, unlike the
financially dependent Fort Belknap court. No. 68-2378 at 5 (E.D.Wash. Feb. 1, 1968).
68 419 F.2d at 489.
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Yakima Tribal Court and the federally funded court of the Fort Belknap community, the Ninth Circuit effectively extended the Colliflower doctrine. 9
The conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Settler v. Yakima was consistent
with that in Colliflower: the district court had jurisdiction under § 2241 to review
tribal custody even though it was pursuant to resolution of an internal affair.
The Yakima Tribal Court, like the Fort Belknap Court of Indian Offenses, was a
federal instrumentality. Custody required by its decisions was therefore "under
color of" United States authority, and could be "in violation of the constitution."
The Ninth Circuit did not, however, consider the tribal court a federal instrumentality for all purposes. Although in Settler v. Yakima the court was a
federal instrumentality for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction, it was held
free from constitutional restriction in the subsequent trial on the merits. The
lattter result is inconsistent with federal instrumentality status; it is, however,
consistent with the Talton docrine.
b. Settler v. Lameer z°
On remand from the Ninth Circuit for decision on the merits, the district
court denied Settler habeas corpus relief because regulation of off-reservation
fishing rights was an "internal affair." 7' The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
After deciding that the tribe had authority to arrest on the reservation
violators of off-reservation fishing regulations, the court quickly disposed of Mr.
Settler's constitutional arguments. Noting the lack of pre-ICRA cases guaranteeing the right to counsel in actions before Indian tribunals, and citing the
legislative history of the ICRA, 2 the views of Senator Ervin, the sponsor of the
1968 Act,7 ' and the many cases following the Talton lead,74 the court concluded:
69 The court also found that modification of the Yakima laws and court system, like those
of Fort Belknap, required federal approval. Although this is technically true, it is not a
federal requirement. Rather, it is a requirement self-imposed by § 41 of the Yakima Indian
Tribal Law and Order Code.
70 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
71 See id. at 233. Settler had been arrested on the reservation for violation of off-reservation
fishing regulations. During the same year, Settler's wife, Mary, arrested off the reservation for
violating off-reservation fishing regulations, pressed a claim with Mr. Settler in federal court
for habeas corpus. The district court granted Ms. Settler's petition for habeas corpus holding
that arrest outside the reservation was "unauthorized and unlawful." The district court's
disposition of these two cases is consistent with the view that the propriety of habeas corpus
relief turned upon that part of § 2241 (c) (3) dealing with custody in violation of federal law
or treaty, and not upon federal instrumentality status or allegations of constitutional violations.
72 Id. at 241 (quoting from the legislative history): "The Federal courts generally have
refused to impose constitutional standards on Indian tribal governments, on the theory that
such standards apply only to State or Federal governmental action, and that Indian tribes are
not States with the meaning of the 14th Amendment."
73 Id. (quoting Senator Ervin) : "The reservation Indian now has no Constitutional rights.
The purpose of the amendment is to give these Indians constitutional rights which other Americans enjoy."
74 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church of North America v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine
Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 '(8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Martinez
v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958). The court also quoted from F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 181,
as follows:
Many important prohibitions, including the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution,
are limitations only on the power of the Federal Government. Other provisions limit
the activities of state governments only, or of the federal and state governments, and
hence are inapplicable to Indian tribes, which are not creatures of either the federal
or state governments.
507 F.2d at 241.
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Here the proceedings in Tribal Court occurred prior to the enactment of
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Accordingly we find no merit in the
contention that the Tribal Court deprived petitioner of his constitutional
rights by denying him representation by professional counsel.7 5
Similarly, the court held that upon the facts alleged double jeopardy did not
take place,7 and in a footnote reiterated that "the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy would not have been applicable since the tribal proceedings occurred prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.""'
The protracted Settler litigation illustrates the futility of the federal instrumentality doctrine as applied by the Ninth Circuit to federal habeas corpus
petitions. Settler v. Yakima was precedent only upon the jurisdictional question.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the regulation of off-reservation fishing was an
internal matter, but even so, the federal court had habeas corpus jurisdiction. In
order to fulfill 28 U.S.C. § 2241 the court relied on the federal instrumentality
doctrine of Colliflower, using it this time against the action of a tribal court. In
addition, two alternative grounds may have been created, neither of which
constitutes a viable basis for habeas corpus jurisdiction: that arbitrary action
exceeded the scope of authority contemplated by treaty, and that there must be a
check upon action which shocks the conscience of the court.
The 1974 Settler decision on the merits, Settler v. Lameer, added the conclusion that once the controversy was determined to be an internal affair, habeas
corpus to challenge lack of procedural safeguards would be denied since the
Constitution did not apply to tribal action."' For purposes of granting or denying
the writ on the merits the tribe was not considered a federal instrumentality, or in
any other way subject to the Constitution. The Settler litigation, therefore, exemplified the awkward situation first created in Colliflower. The federal court
had jurisdiction under § 2241 and the Colliflower doctrine to hear a habeas
corpus claim alleging violation of constitutional rights by a tribe acting upon an
internal matter. Since the tribe could not, however, violate constitutional rights,
the court necessarily denied the petition on its merits.
3. United States v. Wheeler"9
The actual holdings of Colliflower v. Garland and Settler v. Yakima Tribal
Court may seem unimportant due to the passage of the ICRA, which specifically
75 507 F.2d at 241-42.
76 When the tribal court discovered that the prosecutor had mistakenly testified to the
allegations of an offense which took place on a different date, it set aside the conviction and
retried the defendant upon the same charge, but with a corrected recitation of allegations. The
federal court held that upon these facts the retrial did not violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy.
77 Id. at 242 n.26. In the 1974 case the court considered it crucial that Mr. Settler claimed
violations by the tribe of constitutional rights which had not yet been extended to tribal action
by the ICRA. Contrast the result in Settler v. Yakima, in which the court ignored the fact that
at the time of the tribal proceedings the ICRA had not yet extended habeas corpus jurisdiction
to reach tribal action.
78 Put another way, the court implicitly acknowledged that habeas corpus could only be
granted to the confinee in this case in one situation: when the tribe's action was in violation of
treaties or laws of the United States.
79 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977)
(No. 76-1629).
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grants habeas corpus review of tribal custody in violation of that statute. Unfortunately, however, these decisions retain their precedential vitality.8" In addition, their reasoning has proved influential in other areas of the law, areas which
were not affected by the ICRA. Therein lies the danger of the new federal instrumentality doctrine.
In 1974 Anthony Wheeler, a Navajo Indian, was brought before the Navajo
Tribal Court upon charges arising from an incident on the Navajo reservation.
He pleaded guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor and disorderly
conduct. The same incident spawned a subsequent federal indictment for carnal
knowledge of a female Indian under sixteen years of age. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the subsequent prosecution violated the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
Two determinations are necessary to establish double jeopardy. First, the
defendant must be charged twice with the same offense. This was true of
Anthony Wheeler. Second, the prior decision must have been rendered by a
court of the same sovereign as the subsequent tribunal. It was this issue, directly
challenging tribal sovereignty, with which the Ninth Circuit struggled in United
States v. Wheeler.
81
that both the state and federal
It was early established in Moore v. Illinois
governments could try a defendant for a single transaction, the theory being that
the defendant owed allegiance to both and could by one act violate each of
their laws. This dual sovereignty doctrine has been unceasingly criticized from
without and within the Court, 2 and has been confined to the state-federal relationship. Thus, territorial courts could not try a person for an offense previously
disposed of by a federal military court,83 nor could both state and municipal
courts prosecute for a single transaction. 4
From these governmental relationships, the Ninth Circuit was forced to
choose an analogy befitting the relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes. The court acknowledged on the one hand that tribal courts are
sui generis and "not merely a political unit of the federal government." ' If it
accepted this theory completely, however, it was faced with the prospect of
perpetuating the unpopular and strictly construed dual sovereignty exception to
the guarantee against double jeopardy. Its decision reflected the latter concern.
Congress' plenary control over the tribe's criminal jurisdiction helped distinguish
the federal-state relationship, and allowed the Ninth Circuit to select a different
analogy:
If forced to choose a relevant analogy by which to guide our decision in
this case from amongst the courts considered by the Supreme Court in the
double jeopardy-"dual sovereignty" context, we would select territorial
as "civil court[s] proceedcourts, described in Grafton v. United States, supra,
ing under the authority of the United States." 86
80

See text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.

81 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
82 Id. (dissenting opinion); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847)
opinion).
83 See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
84 See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
85 545 F.2d at 1257.
86 Id. at 1257-58.

(dissenting
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The Wheeler court found support for its analogy in Colliflower v. Garland.
According to the Court, the history of the Navajo and Fort Belknap courts was
substantially similar, and the latter had been considered "in part at least" an
arm of the federal government.. The court concluded that:
Indian tribal courts and the United States district courts are not arms of
separate sovereigns. Indian tribes are not states. Thus, the defendant in the

instant case could not be tried in federal district court for the same offense
that he was previously convicted of in Navajo tribal court
8 7 without violating
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
At best Wheeler stands for the proposition that for purposes of double
jeopardy Indian tribal courts and federal district courts are arms of the same
sovereign. The broad language of the opinion could, however, be taken to mean
that for all purposes tribal court identity is subsumed. in the federal court system.
This latter interpretation is doubtful given the conflicting view of the Supreme
Court expressed in Talton, and given Talton's following, including the Ninth
Circuit decision of Tom v. Sutton.
D. The Aftermath of the New Federal Instrumentality Doctrine
The first of the Ninth Circuit opinions which equated Indian court action
with federal action came down in 1965. Subsequent decisions in other circuits
either wholly disregarded the Ninth Circuit's views, as did the Ninth Circuit
itself in Settler v. Lameer, s or addressed and expressly rejected them in their
opinions.
87 Id. at 1258. The actual effect of Wheeler may appear innocuous or indeed supportive
tribal sovereignty. An Indian tribe could, after Wheeler, preclude federal prosecution by
prosecuting the defendant itself for a lesser included offense within the tribe's criminal jurisdiction. Implicit in the power, it may be argued, is a respect for the tribal system of justice. This
position fails to acknowledge that the reverse is also true: a tribe would have no opportunity,
with regard to defendants already proceeded against in federal court, to vindicate its interests
in prosecuting persons violating tribal law. It also ignores the dynamics of the federal-Indian
relationship with regard to criminal jurisdiction. Unless specifically restricted by federal legislation, Indian tribes retain jurisdiction over all crimes committed within their territorial
jurisdictions. Congress has extended federal jurisdiction to fourteen major crimes committed
within Indian territory; all other crimes are handled by tribal authorities, which labor under a
limitation of penalties. In its petition for certiori in the Wheeler case, the government justifiably argued that tribal power to preempt federal prosecution would not long be tolerated by
Congress since perpetrators of serious offenses could be free upon fulfillment of the limited
tribal penalties. Legislation further limiting tribal jurisdiction or requiring federal approval of
tribal prosecutions would be a likely result of the Wheeler conclusion.
There remains a solution to the Wheeler dilemma which may in any case endanger
residual tribal jurisdiction, but without unnecessarily negating tribal sovereignty through use of
the federal instrumentality doctrine. Undoubtedly double federal prosecution is against the
United States Constitution, and equally undoubtedly double tribal prosecution is prohibited by
the ICRA. When a federal court wishes to try a defendant after an Indian court has done so,
the defendant is confronted by an interstitial area not covered by the Constitution or federal
law, similar to that encountered in the state-federal relationship. There is authority in
Congress to fill this gap through appropriate legislation in the case of tribal-federal prosecutions.
Since Congress is the sole body which can restrict tribal freedom, it should be left to that body
to work out an equitable distribution of tribal and federal jurisdiction, and to provide the
necessary safeguards to individuals within the confines of tribal sovereignty.
88 Although the Lameer court must have realized that its jurisdiction was due to
Colliflower and Settler v. Yakima, it did not mention those decisions with regard to the merits.
The Ninth Circuit in Wheeler, and other courts, such as those which decided Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975) and Dodge, either
utilized or felt compelled to expressly reject the Colliflower analysis in a nonjurisdictional context.
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One court which explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's federal instrumentality doctrine was the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Walking Crow. 9 That
Court stated when faced with the identical issue decided in United States v.
Wheeler: "With all due respect to [the Ninth Circuit] we disagree with its holding and decline to follow it."9
John Walking Crow, a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, was indicted in
federal court for the crime of robbery after he had pleaded guilty to a lesser
included offense before the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court. In a motion to dismiss
the federal indictment, Walking Crow alleged that the subsequent federal prosecution would violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
As in Wheeler, the decision turned upon whether the tribal and federal
courts were arms of the same sovereign. In resolving that question the Eighth
Circuit relied upon its decision in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe9 "that the
tribal courts are not creations of the federal constitution or of federal statutes,
and that their jurisdiction is inherent with respect to all matters that have not
been taken away from them."92 The court noted that while 18 U.S.C. § 1153
"took away from the Indian tribes and their tribal courts jurisdiction over enumerated offenses, the jurisdiction that was left to them was in our view an
inherent and original jurisdiction of quasi-sovereign powers."'" It therefore concluded "that a tribal court in administering its residual jurisdiction is not acting
as an adjudicatory arm of the federal government, and that it is not simply an
inferior court in the federal judicial system." 94
The Walking Crow court also disposed of an argument that had been raised
in Talton. The petitioner in Talton v. Mayes had argued that potential federal
control over tribal jurisdiction in some way negated inherent tribal authority to
govern internal affairs. The Supreme Court's reply was that the existence of
Congressional power "does not render such local powers Federal powers arising
'
from and created by the constitution of the United States." 95
When faced with a
similar argument, the Eighth Circuit stated:
It is quite true as the Ninth Circuit points out in United States v. Wheeler,
supra, 545 F. 2d at 1257, that the United States has plenary control over
the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts. That does not answer the question.
While Congress might deprive the tribal courts of all of their residual
jurisdiction to try offenses not punishable under . 1153, it has not seen
fit to do so. 96
Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded, as did the Supreme Court in Talton, that

89
90
91
92
93
94

No.
Id.
231
See
No.
Id.

77-1136 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1977).

95
96

163 U.S. at 384.
No. 77-1136 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1977).

F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
note 65 supra.
77-1136 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1977).
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the potential power of Congress did not transform inherent tribal authority into
authority granted to the tribes by the United States government. The tribe was
97
not a conduit, a mere federal instrumentality.
The Eighth Circuit decision rejecting the new federal instrumentality
doctrine is consistent with the Talton analysis and with the numerous decisions
espousing the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. The basis of the Wheeler decision
rests on shakier ground, namely, the aberrational decisions of Colliflower v.
Garland and Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court.
The Arizona District Court in Dodge v. Nakai9 8 also refused to adopt the
Colliflower analysis. That controversy arose when the Advisory Committee of the
Navajo Tribal Council excluded a non-Indian from the Navajo Reservation.
Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the exclusion violated their first, fourth, fifth,
sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights. In response to the contention that
Colliflower altered the principles set forth in Talton, Native American Church,
Barta, and other pro-sovereignty cases the court stated:
In the face of those decisions holding that the internal and social affairs of
the Navajo tribe were exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal
government existed, subject only to action on the part of Congress, this
Court declines to now decide that these affairs have always been subject to
adjudication in this Court as controversies arising under the Constitution of
the United States. 99
Two opinions which totally ignore the existence of the new federal instrumentality doctrine came from the Ninth Circuit itself in 1974 and 1976. The
first was Settler v. Lameer.'0 9 The second, Tom v. Sutton,' affirmed dismissal
of a petition for habeas corpus0 2 which alleged violations of the petitioner's sixth
and fourteenth amendment rights to the assistance of appointed counsel before
the tribal court. The Ninth Circuit cited Talton and its progeny and held:

97 The Eighth Circuit subsequently decided the same issue with regard to double jeopardy
in favor of tribal independence from the federal judiciary. That court held in United States v.
Elk, No. 77-1263 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 1977), that the Fort Berthold Tribal Court and the
federal district court were not arms of the same sovereign. The claim of double jeopardy was
denied.
The Eighth Circuit in Walking Crow and Elk adopted as the correct approach dicta of
that court in United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973), rejecting the view that tribal courts derive their authority from the federal
government.
98 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
99 Id. at 23. Other post-Colliflower cases which rely upon Talton and mention either
Colliflower or the federal instrumentality doctrine include: Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of
the Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975), Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674
(10th Cir. 1971) (where the court stated as dictum that an Indian tribe "is not a federal
instrumentality and is not within the reach of the fifth amendment," at 678), Twin Cities
Chippewa Tribal C. v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967), Sturdevant
v. Deer, 70 F.R.D. 539 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet
Indian Reservation, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mon. 1969).
100 See note 88 supra.
101 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Jacobson v. Potawatomi Community, 389 F.
Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis 1974) (dictum); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974).
102 Jurisdiction to hear this petition was based upon 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1977). For
the text of this provision see note 10 supra.
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Although an individual citizen's right to appointed counsel is protected under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in criminal actions brought by the
United States and the individual states thereof, Indians on the reservation
do not have such protection under the federal constitution when the
criminal action is brought under the tribal law in tribal court. Under their
sovereign status, the Indian tribes are vested with the inherent power to
create and administer a criminal justice system, Ortiz Barraza v. United
1975), and the power to adopt their own
States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th 10Cir.
3
constitution and enact laws.
Nowhere in the decision was any mention of the federal instrumentality doctrine.
Instead, Tom v. Sutton was another endorsement of tribal independence from
federal constitutional restraint, this time from the Ninth Circuit itself.
E. Critique of the New FederalInstrumentality Doctrine
In addition to being contrary to precedent, and myopic in the case of
habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit's use of the label "federal instrumentality" is undoubtedly result-oriented. Judicial reliance upon such an approach obscured the real issues involved in Colliflower, Settler v. Yakima, and
Wheeler. Even more importantly, it camouflaged judicial creation of law in an
area traditionally left to Congress.
That the Ninth Circuit approach is result-oriented is obvious from the
limited nature of the holdings. In Settler v. Yakima the Yakima Tribal Court was
a federal instrumentality for the purpose of habeas corpus. In United States v.
Wheeler the Navajo Tribal Court was a federal instrumentality for the purpose of
double jeopardy."0 4 Logic requires that one entity either is or is not a federal
instrumentality. Even the Ninth Circuit would agree that as a general rule no
Supreme Court
institution of tribal government is a federal instrumentality.'
decisions such as Talton recognized that Indian tribes have inherent power to selfgovern and to try defendants under Indian law, power which existed prior to
the appearance of any non-Indian upon this continent. Therefore, without
regard to the result desired in a particular case, the argument that an Indian
Court is a federal instrumentality would have to be rejected upon reasoning
consistent with precedent.
The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that for certain limited purposes
Indian courts are arms of the federal government. For example, the Yakima
Tribal Court was held to be a federal instrumentality for the purpose of habeas
corpus, but was not so considered for the purpose of right to counsel or double
jeopardy. This result is unsatisfactory. Either the Yakima Tribal Court is or is
not a federal instrumentality. Obviously, the characteristics of the court remained
the same from one judicial inquiry to the next. The result desired by the Ninth
103 533 F.2d at 1103.
104 Although the Wheeler court's language leaves open the possibility that the Navajo
Tribal Court would be considered a federal instrumentality for all purposes, the fact that the
Ninth Circuit has adhered to Talton on the merits in Lameer and Tom v. Sutton makes that
conclusion unlikely.
105 See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231
(9th Cir. 1974).
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Circuit in Settler v. Yakima was the only crucial difference.'
The Wheeler decision provides yet another illustration of the result-oriented
approach of the Ninth Circuit. The issue upon which Wheeler turned was
whether the Navajo Tribal Court and the federal district court were arms of the
same sovereign. In all situations except for two aberrational opinions dealing
with habeas corpus jurisdiction, the courts had repeatedly held that Indian tribes
and their governmental institutions were not federal instrumentalities. Therefore,
proper resolution of that issue, without regard to the outcome of the case, should
have been that the Navajo Tribal Court was not an arm of the same sovereign
as the federal district court. The main concern of the Ninth Circuit, however,
was to avoid extension of the highly criticized dual sovereignty exception to the
rule against double jeopardy. An easy escape from the dilemma was to label the
Navajo Tribal Court a federal instrumentality for the purpose of double jeopardy.
The propriety of reaching a desired result at the expense of tribal sovereignty
is open to question. Convenient though it may have been to brand this sovereign
court an arm of the federal government, the result was a dangerous negation of
tribal sovereignty, and not to be tolerated'as a mere device by which the court can
escape from the effects of a prior unpopular decision.
Another difficulty with the result-oriented approach is that it can obscure the
actual decision-making process of the court. According to the Ninth Circuit the
Yakima Tribal Court was a federal instrumentality for the purpose of habeas
corpus jurisdiction, but not for the purpose of right to counsel or double
jeopardy.' 7 Federal instrumentality status evidently depends not upon a factual
connection between the federal government and the tribal court, but upon the
restraint to be imposed upon tribal action. If such is the case, the Ninth Circuit
must have undertaken an analysis of the particular restraint and its effect upon
individual and tribal rights before rendering its decisions in the federal instrumentality cases. The reader, however, received the bare result and was left to
wonder why the same Indian court was alternately a federal instrumentality and
not a federal instrumentality.
Without the benefit of judicial analysis one can only speculate upon the
motivation of the Ninth Circuit in deciding to use or not use the federal instrumentality doctrine. In all likelihood the Ninth Circuit could not tolerate the
risk of arbitrary imprisonment by an Indian tribe without remedy in the federal
courts. Although Congress had not yet seen fit to extend the writ of habeas
corpus to cases of tribal confinement, that writ is basic to the United States
system of justice, a necessary component of fundamental fairness.'
The need
for the writ arguably outweighs the tribal right to self-govern. By contrast, the
underlying denial of constitutional rights such as right to counsel may not, given
the Indian system of justice, have outweighed the potential disruption to tribal
106 One need only look to the passage quoted in the text accompanying note 57 supra, to see
that the Ninth Circuit was motivated by something other than a factual determination when
it identified tribal action with federal action, namely by a desire to vindicate individual rights
and to limit tribal power. The federal instrumentality doctrine was merely a tool used to reach
this result.
107 See note 54 supra.
108 This point was stressed repeatedly in Ms. Colliflower's Second Memorandum Brief For
Applicant.
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court procedure that would result from introduction of this foreign element.
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit did not weigh competing rights at all. The point
of the speculation is that there must be some reason, outside of a factual determination, why a court is sometimes a federal instrumentality and sometimes
09
not."
The conclusory decisions of the Ninth Circuit have denied readers the
benefit of this analysis.
The more disturbing aspect of the Ninth Circuit's result-oriented approach
is that it allows the court to differentiate between various restraints upon federal
action and to impose upon tribal government those it considers desirable. By
calling an Indian court a federal instrumentality for one purpose and not for
another, the court is covertly engaging in judicial legislation, contrary to the
rule that tribal authority to act within its jurisdiction remains unbridled unless
specifically restrained by congressional act.1 '
The Settler v. Yakima decision provides a clear illustration of the Ninth
Circuit's dilemma. The court desired to extend habeas corpus jurisdiction to
include review of custody by a tribal government. In searching for authority to
reach this result the court stated:
The attempt by a state to prosecute its citizens in a summary and arbitrary
fashion may be successfully attacked, as may an attempt to regulate certain
activities of its domiciliaries without the state. Likewise (without expressing
any opinion on the merits of the constitutional issues in the present case),
although the Fourteenth Amendment may not apply to tribal courts there
must be and is a limit to the "exclusive" authority of the Yakima Nation to
regulate Indian fishing when that regulation becomes so summary and
arbitrary as to shock the conscience of the federal court, or goes beyond the
scope of authority originally contemplated by the Treaty of 1859.11
Two aspects of this language warrant attention. First, the court knows a priori
that there must be some limits upon tribal action. Without relying upon
Colliflower, however, none could be articulated. All legitimate avenues of extending habeas corpus jurisdiction to tribal custody had been closed. Although it
109 One reason may be that the court has felt obligated to follow Talton in all cases
except those involving habeas corpus jurisdiction, in which it could find a loophole, and those
involving double jeopardy, in which it is defining the relationship between the federal government and the tribe rather than applying the constitution to tribal courts. This constraint, if
felt, has not been articulated.

Unlike many of the other courts deciding issues of constitu-

tionality similar to that in Lameer and Sutton, the Ninth Circuit has not seen fit to deal with
its own doctrine. Instead it has silently perpetuated two lines of precedent. Although reconciliation of the outcome in Settler v. Yakima and Lameer would be difficult at best, some

attempt to analyze the situation would be helpful if use of the doctrine is to continue in the
Ninth Circuit.
110 F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 123, states:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian Tribal powers is marked
by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the
first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its powers to enter into treaties with
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its
powers of self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties
and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted
organs of government (emphasis added).
111 419 F.2d at 489.
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had the power to do so, Congress had not yet seen fit to expressly subject the tribe
to habeas corpus review. A holding that the tribal court was a federal instrumentality for all purposes was out of the question due to the well-established
precedent of Talton and its progeny. The "scope of authority" argument would
breach all canons of treaty interpretation, and conduct which shocks the conscience of the court has only been considered unconstitutional when the entity
whose action shocks the court is itself subject to the Constitution.
The court pointed out that states cannot act arbitrarily: federal courts
have limited state action by incorporating into the fourteenth amendment the
most important safeguards in the United States Constitution. Although the
propriety of this judicial creation of law has been hotly debated, no one would
deny that there is some authority in the Constitution, namely, the fourteenth
amendment, on which to base a judicial extension of the Bill of Rights to state
action. Undaunted by a lack of analogous authority, the Settler court used the
new federal instrumentality doctrine with regard to Indian tribes to this same
end, i.e., to ensure that those limitations upon federal action, considered crucial by
the Ninth Circuit, were imposed upon tribal action.
When the Ninth Circuit said that "there must be and is a limit" it was
wrong. The only limits upon tribal authority are those which are specifically imposed by Congress." 2 With regard to those restraints extended to Indian tribes
through the federal instrumentality doctrine, Congress had not acted. At the
time of the arrests of Collifower and Settler, Congress had not yet seen fit to
create federal jurisdiction to review tribal detention. Wheeler was decided after
the passage of the ICRA. That statute, however, did not preclude the federal
government from trying a defendant on the same charge which he had faced
before an Indian tribunal. With such recent congressional consideration of the
matter, the judiciary should have been reluctant to create its own law.
The Ninth Circuit may have been legitimately concerned with the protection
of individual rights through habeas corpus and the prohibition against double
jeopardy. The concept of tribal sovereignty, however, should not have been
sacrificed in order to attain an admittedly salutary goal. The District Court of
Arizona, in Dodge v. Nakai,"3 recognized the dangers inherent in the Ninth
Circuit's approach. In Dodge, the court was confronted with the argument that
Colliflower v. Garlandaltered the principles established in Talton, Native American Church, Barta, and the other decisions discussed above. The court's reply
was that:
Colliflower would be analogous to this case only if this Court were able to
determine that the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council,...,
"functioned in part as a federal agency." But the establishment of that
proposition would not merely act as an inroad on Navajo tribal sovereignty,
it would end it.11
112 See note 110 supra. See also Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir.
1975) (tribes possess an inherent sovereignty except where it has been specifically taken away
by treaty or act of Congress); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
113 298 F.Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
114 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
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When Congressional action is available to protect the individual without destroying tribal sovereignty, judicial creation of individual rights at the price of tribal
sovereignty is not the preferred solution.
F. Ramifications
The issue of federal instrumentality status may seem academic given the
passage of the ICRA, which subjects tribal action to many of the restraints of the
Constitution. It is important, however, to take notice of what the ICRA did
not do. The original version of the bill submitted to Congress would have subjected the Indian tribe "to the same limitations and restraints as those which are
imposed on the Government of the United States by the United States Constitution.""' 5 Due to arguments advanced at the Senate subcommittee hearing by and
on behalf of the tribes, the bill was altered and eventually adopted in a form more
consistent with tribal sovereignty. The summary of the report of the Senate
Subcommittee on the Judiciary, endorsed and adopted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, stated:
The Department of Interior's bill would, in effect, impose the same
restrictions applicable presently to the Federal and State governments with
several notable exceptions, viz., the fifteenth admendment, certain of the
procedural requirements of the fifth, sixth, and seventh amendments, and
in some respects, the equal protection requirement of the fourteenth amendment.
The restrictive nature of the ICRA underlies the present importance of the
federal instrumentality doctrine. The ICRA specifically granted habeas corpus
to review confinement by a tribe in violation of that statute. Because some constitutional rights were omitted from the ICRA, however, custody by a tribe may
not be in violation of that statute even though the same action by the federal
government would violate the United States Constitution. In these situations
jurisdiction under the ICRA does not apply and the defendant's only recourse
will be to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) and the Colliflower.doctrine.
Even if a court grants habeas corpus jurisdiction under the Colliflower
rationale, it must, under the law as it now stands, reject the constitutional claim
on the merits. It is possible, however, that as the new federal instrumentality
doctrine matures, it will be applied to the merits of such cases. To the extent
that the federal instrumentality doctrine becomes entrenched as a valid concept,
the sovereign rights left untouched by the ICRA become an endangered species.
If the Fort Belknap court is considered a federal instrumentality for jurisdictional
purposes, one may logically argue that the tribe should be required to provide
counsel to indigent defendants.
Wheeler is a case in point. The ICRA did not speak to the issue of multiple
prosecutions involving the federal government and an Indian tribe. Even though
the case did not involve habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Colliflower doctrine was
115 The legislative history of the ICRA is reviewed in Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th
Cir. 1976), and Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
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borrowed from its limited sphere and applied by the Ninth Circuit in order to
extend to tribal action a restraint upon the federal government.
Other attempts to subject the tribes, through invocation of the federal
instrumentality doctrine, to constitutional restraints not included in the ICRA,
have been unsuccessful. 16 The strategy most often employed in those cases
is to argue first that the tribe violated the Constitution, and second that the tribe
violated the more general provisions of the ICRA such as the due process or
equal protection clauses. Since use of the federal instrumentality doctrine to
establish the first proposition would be dispositive in these cases, it is not surprising that the doctrine has been raised, albeit to no avail.
Even though the first argument may fail, the second might prove more and
more successful with the increasing use of the federal instrumentality doctrine in
other circuits. Courts not adopting the questionable federal instrumentality
doctrine may nonetheless become favorable to the anti-sovereignty philosophy
it represents, and react by expanding the meaning of ambiguous ICRA clauses
to include constitutional rights not extended to the tribe by that statute.
A further danger exists. Even where the ICRA echoes the exact words of
the Federal Constitution, courts have expressed a willingness to minimize the
harmful effects of that statute by interpreting the language in a manner sensitive
to tribal culture. In Janis v. Wilson"' the plaintiffs claimed that the tribe violated
their federal constitutional rights and their rights under the ICRA by terminating
their public employment due to participation in political activities during working
hours. After the court used the Talton doctrine to dismiss the constitutional claim
for lack of jurisdiction, it stated with regard to the statutory claim:
Although Congress used language in 25 U.S.C. § 1302 from the Bill of
Rights, this Court is of the opinion that the meaning and application of 25
U.S.C. § 1302 to Indian tribes must necessarily be somewhat different than
the established Anglo-American legal meaning and application of the Bill of
Rights on federal and state governments....
Therefore the plaintiffs' remaining claims under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1)
and (8), under the facts of this case, must not be measured by the same
standards imposed by the Bill of Rights on state and federal governments, but
rather these limitations must be applied with recognition of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe's unique cultural heritage, their experience in self government,
and the disadvantages or burdens, if any, under which the defendant tribal
government was attempting to carry out its duties., 8

116 See, e.g., Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th
Cir. 1975). In Wounded Head, a claim simultaneously alleging illegality under the ICRA and
violations of the federal constitution met defeat on both grounds. In response to the allegation
that members of the tribe between the ages of 18 to 21 were unconstitutionally denied a vote in
tribal elections the court cited cases such as Talton, and held that the twenty-sixth amendment
did not apply to internal tribal elections. Moreover the equal protection clause of the ICRA
did not preclude the tribe from establishing, for tribal elections, a minimum voting age of
twenty-one. See also Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968), where the federal
instrumentality doctrine was rejected. In that case most of the alleged constitutional violations
concerned restraints extended to the tribes by the ICRA.
117 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974).
118 Id. at 1150-51.
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Although other courts have expressed views similar to that put forth in Janis, a
firm establishment of the federal instrumentality doctrine within other circuits
may negatively affect the willingness of these courts to interpret those restrictions
extended to tribal government with an eye toward preserving Indian culture
and tribal sovereignty."'
Perhaps use of the federal instrumentality doctrine will be circumscribed by
the Supreme Court in the upcoming decision of United States v. Wheeler.
Perhaps it will no longer be used as a conclusory means to subject tribes to restrictions upon federal action. Regardless of its future application in cases such as
Colliflower, Settler v. Yakima, and Wheeler, the rationale of the federal instrumentality doctrine may undoubtedly be utilized by those who wish, for whatever
purpose, to negate existence of independent tribal authority. Such a tool constitutes a substantial threat to tribal sovereignty.
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit in several recent decisions has misappropriated a tool
utilized by the courts to exempt from state taxation tribal land, lessees of tribal
property, and the leases themselves. Its use of the federal instrumentality doctrine
has not only generated useless litigation in the habeas corpus context, but, more
importantly, has obscured the crucial issue of priority among tribal and individual
rights. Moreover, resort to the conclusory label of federal instrumentality for a
certain purpose has permitted the court to create individual rights for which there
is no basis in the Constitution or in federal legislation pertaining to Indians.
Had the ICRA been made coextensive with the federal Bill of Rights, the
source of individual rights against tribal action may have become an academic
question.'
Those areas of tribal control left unscathed by the 1968 act, as well
as those which, although covered, survive due to restrictive interpretation of that
act are, however, put in jeopardy by these unprecedented decisions of the Ninth
Circuit.
Benedetta A. Kissel

119 Certainly a pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the upcoming case of United
States v. Wheeler that for certain purposes the tribe is to be considered a mere tool of the
federal government would diminish the vigor of those courts which might otherwise act to
protect tribal self-government.
120 Even if the ICRA were coextensive with the Bill of Rights, tribal subjection to statutory
restraints upon federal agencies would remain a possibility under the federal instrumentality
doctrine.
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